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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a 9-0 decision,1 the United States Supreme Court refused to 
find that a California state court had acted “contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,”2 
when that court found that it was not prejudicial for trial audience 
members to wear buttons with the image of the defendant’s alleged 
murder victim. The Court relied upon the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and its previous rulings in 
Estelle v. Williams3 and Holbrook v. Flynn,4 earlier cases that defined 
certain actions as prejudicial to a defendant in a court of law. The 
Court found that due to the lack of any Supreme Court ruling related 
to the fact pattern in this particular case, it could not find that the 
state trial court acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied federal 
law.5 
In Carey, the Court skirts the issue of whether a trial court 
violated federal law concerning prejudice by determining that the 
particular law did not exist. Rather than filling the gap with new law, 
the Court opts not to formulate new law, despite the fact that the case 
brings up several important questions, namely: (1) whether tests such 
as those in Williams6 and Flynn7 apply to spectator’s conduct; and, (2) 
where to draw the line of spectators’ rights to express their views and 
 
 * 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006). 
 2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1996). 
 3. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 4. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). 
 5. Carey, 127 S. Ct at 651. 
 6. Williams, 425 U.S. at 505. 
 7. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 570. 
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opinions in a court of law. The failure to answer these important 
questions may be best explained by the Court’s desire to leave the 
question of what constitutes prejudicial conduct to trial court judges, 
the senators in the courtroom. 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Matthew Musladin was convicted of first-degree murder and three 
related offenses in a California state court.8 During his trial, the family 
members of the victim wore buttons with the image of the victim in 
the courtroom. Counsel for Musladin moved the court to order the 
family not to wear the buttons, claiming that they were prejudicial to 
the defendant.9 The court denied the motion, finding the buttons did 
not prejudice the defendant.10 Musladin appealed his conviction to the 
California Court of Appeal claiming that the lower court violated his 
Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the family to 
wear the buttons.11 The Court of Appeal, citing Holbrook v. Flynn,12 
noted that Musladin had to show actual or inherent prejudice in order 
to succeed on his claim. Instead, the California court concluded that 
although the practice of wearing photographs of the victim was to be 
discouraged, the wearing of the buttons created no such prejudice in 
this case.13 
Upon his unsuccessful appeal in the California court system, 
Musladin filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in federal 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.14 The federal district court 
denied habeas relief. However, it granted a certificate of appealability 
on the buttons issue to determine if they were prejudicial.15 When the 
case reached the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court 
reversed the district court decision and remanded for issuance of the 
writ. The Ninth Circuit held that the state court’s ruling “was contrary 
 
 8. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 651. 
 9. Id. at 652. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). 
 13. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 652. 
 14. Id.  The statute permits an individual, in custody pursuant to a state court ruling, to file 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus if they believe their conviction was the result of the 
state court acting contrary to, or unreasonably applying federal law.  The statute thus allows one 
to have their state court claim reviewed in federal court. 
 15. Id. 
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to clearly established federal law and constituted an unreasonable 
application of that law.”16 
The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Estelle v. Williams17 and Holbrook v. Flynn,18 determining 
that these cases provided a clearly established rule of federal law (the 
test for inherent prejudice applicable to spectators’ courtroom 
conduct) that should have been applied to Musladin’s case.19 The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision was appealed, and ultimately the Supreme 
Court vacated the ruling of the Ninth Circuit, finding that clear 
federal law relating to Musladin’s case did not exist, and thus the 
California state courts did not act contrary to, or unreasonably apply, 
federal law.20 
III. HOLDING 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, which 
discussed the evolution of federal law relating to prejudicial practices 
in the courtroom.21 The opinion begins by citing the AEPDA: 
[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.22 
The Act clearly states that an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus can be granted only if the decision “was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law.”23 As a result, the Court noted the need to evaluate established 
federal law dealing with prejudice in the courtroom. 
Like the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme Court opinion cites 
 
 16. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 659–60 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 17. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 18. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). 
 19. Musladin, 427 F.3d at 657–58. 
 20. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 652 (2006). 
 21. Id. 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 23. Id. 
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the two major cases dealing with this issue: Estelle v. Williams24 and 
Holbrook v. Flynn.25 In Williams, the Court considered whether a 
defendant’s presence in the courtroom while dressed in prison 
clothing was prejudicial.26 The Williams Court found that a State 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment if it “compel[s] an accused to 
stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes.”27 
In Flynn, the Court considered whether the sitting of four uniformed 
state troopers behind the defendant was prejudicial.28 Unlike in 
Williams, the Flynn Court held that the “presence of the troopers was 
not so inherently prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial.”29 
The opinion notes that both of these situations were factually 
dissimilar from the situation in Musladin’s case. The Court 
distinguishes Williams and Flynn on other grounds as well, noting that 
the cases dealt with government-sponsored practices, but the situation 
in Musladin dealt with the actions of private spectators at trial.30 The 
Court acknowledged that it has “never addressed a claim that such 
private-actor courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it 
deprived a defendant of a fair trial.”31 The opinion notes that the tests 
established by Williams and Flynn to determine the existence of 
prejudice at a trial ask whether a given practice furthers an essential 
state interest, which “suggests that those cases apply only to state-
sponsored practices.”32 
As a result of the lack of a clear standard derived from Supreme 
Court precedent, the lower courts have diverged in how they handle 
the issue of spectators’ conduct. Lower courts have taken four general 
approaches to these types of claims for spectators’ conduct: (1) they 
apply Williams and Flynn;33 (2) they decline to extend Williams and 
Flynn;34 (3) they have distinguished Flynn on the facts;35 and (4) they 
 
 24. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 25. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986). 
 26. Williams, 425 U.S. at 502. 
 27. Id. at 512. 
 28. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 562. 
 29. Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006) (citing Flynn, 475 U.S. at 571). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 654. 
 33. See Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the wearing of 
buttons worn by spectators’ during a trial violated the defendant’s rights under Williams and 
Flynn); In re Woods, 114 P.3d 607, 617 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) (holding that Flynn applied, 
however ribbons worn by spectators did not harm the defendant). 
 34. See Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that Williams does not 
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have ruled on spectator-conduct claims without relying on, discussing, 
or distinguishing Williams or Flynn.36 
Due to the lack of holdings by the Supreme Court regarding the 
prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom conduct, and the fact that 
no ruling of the Court has held that the tests of Williams and Flynn 
must be applied to spectators’ conduct, the majority in Carey held 
that “it cannot be said that the state court ‘unreasonably applied 
clearly established federal law.’”37 As a result, the Court vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.38 
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter delivered concurring 
opinions.39 The concurring opinions pay homage to the various 
questions that arose in this case, which the majority failed to answer. 
Although these opinions make note of the unanswered questions, 
they still do not provide any clarity, and instead state that they should 
be answered at another time. As a result, the concurring opinions are 
simply used to inform the reader that the court is aware of the various 
issues in this case, but is reluctant to deal with them. It can be argued 
that the Court’s reluctance is based on its desire to keep power in the 
hands of the state courts. 
Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion focuses on dictum by Justice 
O’Connor in the Williams decision, which stated that “clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” refers 
to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of 
the time of the relevant state-court decision.”40 Though the Carey 
majority agrees with this statement, Justice Stevens does not. Instead, 
Justice Stevens believes that inclusion of dicta provides a correct 
interpretation of the AEDPA. He explained that when the Court’s 
opinions announce a new application of a constitutional principle, any 
 
clearly establish a rule that any article worn in the courtroom violates a defendant’s rights). 
 35. See Pachl v. Zenon, 929 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (en banc) (noting that 
although the wearing of buttons by spectators seemed to meet the Flynn test, when considering 
the entire trial it could not be said that the defendant was prejudiced). 
 36. See Buckner v. State, 714 So.2d 384, 389 (Fla. 1998) (holding without any reference to 
Williams and Flynn that the trial judge properly found spectator conduct not to be prejudicial); 
State v. Speed, 961 P.2d 13, 30 (Kan. 1998) (holding without any reference to Williams or Flynn 
that buttons worn by spectators did not prejudice the defendant). 
 37. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 654. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 651. 
 40. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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explanatory language that is intended to provide guidance to lawyers 
and judges should be considered, regardless of whether it is dicta.41 
Justice Stevens’s concurrence was closely aligned with Justice Souter’s 
concurrence, discussed below, with one notable exception. Justice 
Souter viewed the buttons as a potential First Amendment right,42 but 
Justice Stevens argued that there was “no merit whatsoever to the 
suggestion that the First Amendment may provide some measure of 
protection to spectators in a courtroom who engage in actual or 
symbolic speech to express any point of view about an ongoing 
proceeding.”43 
Justice Souter drafted a concurring opinion. He explained how the 
Court has clearly adopted a federal standard for evaluating 
prejudicial behavior in a court of law, and that “it reaches the 
behavior of spectators.”44 He cites a history of Supreme Court cases 
that defined prejudice in the courtroom as anything open to the 
jurors’ courtroom observations that can prejudice a defendant. These 
prejudicial observations are contrary to federal law, regardless of 
whether the prejudice inheres to the state or a spectator.45 He 
espoused the possibility that the buttons worn by a victim’s family 
could create an air of prejudice against a defendant, in that an 
“expected response [by the jury] could well seem to be a verdict of 
guilty.”46 Despite this, he stated that the buttons are only 
impermissible if the risk of prejudice reaches an unacceptable level. 
Here, Justice Souter provides two reasons why the risk does not 
reach an unacceptable level.47 First, several courts have dealt with 
similar facts as those in this case, and the majority of them have found 
a lack of prejudice.48 Second, there is an interest in protecting the 
expression of the spectators in a courtroom.49 Justice Souter does not 
go so far as to find First Amendment protection granted to spectators, 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]n the absence of developed argument it 
would be preferable not to decide whether protection of speech could require acceptance of 
some risk raised by spectators' buttons.”). 
 43. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) 
 44. Id. at 657 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. The cases cited include Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) and Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). 
 46. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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stating that “it would be preferable not to decide whether protection 
of speech could require acceptance of some risk raised by spectators’ 
buttons.”50 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion discusses the importance of 
keeping trials free of a coercive or intimidating atmosphere.51 Justice 
Kennedy cited several cases, including Frank v. Mangum,52 Moore v. 
Dempsey,53 and Sheppard v. Maxwell,54 all of which required “a court, 
on either direct or collateral review, to order a new trial when a 
defendant shows his conviction has been obtained in a trial tainted by 
an atmosphere of coercion or intimidation.”55 The concurrence noted 
that if the wearing of buttons created a form of intimidation similar to 
that in the aforementioned cases, then relief should be granted, 
regardless of whether or not a Supreme Court case dealt directly with 
a situation similar to Musladin’s.56 Justice Kennedy’s examination of 
the Carey facts, however, determined that the buttons created no type 
of coercion or intimidation. His concurrence differed from the 
plurality because he believed it was necessary for the Court to 
develop a new rule dealing with the situation in Musladin’s case.57 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, makes it clear that the 
Court should rule on the factual issue of whether a button with the 
image of a victim worn in the courtroom would prejudice a 
defendant.58 The majority refuses to rule on that for two possible 
reasons, alluded to above. First, the Court defers to trial judges’ 
discretion to determine whether or not items, such as the buttons, are 
prejudicial. Because the trial judges are in the courtroom at the time, 
they are the best candidates to determine whether or not a given 
practice is prejudicial. As support for this notion, Justice Souter’s 
 
 50. Id.  Justice Souter noted the possibility that a First Amendment argument could be 
made in this situation, but felt it should not come into play with these facts. Justice Stevens 
rejected the possibility that a First Amendment argument could be present. Id. at 656. 
 51. Id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 52. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) 
 53. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) 
 54. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) 
 55. Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 657. 
 58. Id. 
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concurrence notes the importance of the lower court judges’ rulings, 
stating his reluctance to find prejudice when the majority of lower-
court judges did not find buttons of this nature to be prejudicial.59 A 
second rationale for the Court’s failure to address the issue is the 
Court’s fear of moving towards the development of a laundry list of 
prejudicial items, thereby eroding the powers of trial court judges. A 
judicial economy argument is at hand. Such a list would likely result 
in more petitions to the Court, and the overturning of otherwise valid 
convictions. 
The second issue the Court fails to resolve is whether the tests for 
prejudicing the defendant extend to spectators. Although Justice 
Souter directly addressed this issue in his concurring opinion, stating 
that “there is no serious question that [the prejudicial test] reaches 
the behavior of spectators,”60 the majority does not attempt to resolve 
the issue. The majority’s failure to address the matter, other than 
pointing to the fact that the Court has never specifically dealt with the 
issue, enhanced the idea that federal law on trial prejudice is hazy, and 
thus supports the actions of the California state court. By noting that 
the Court has not addressed the issue before, and then failing to do so 
now, the Court further supports the lack of a clear federal law, and 
instead provides that the lower courts should be applying the 
standard of law regarding prejudice in the courtroom because it is the 
trial judges who can best determine if a courtroom practice or 
conduct is prejudicial. 
Finally, the Court fails to address whether any rights are violated if 
spectators are not allowed to express themselves in a court of law. 
Neither the majority opinion nor any of the concurring opinions seek 
to provide an answer to this question. The reluctance of the Court to 
deal with this First Amendment question is likely due to the 
magnitude of the issue. This case did not have anything to do with the 
free speech rights of the spectators, and although the Court is allowed 
to consider any given issue when ruling on a case, it is more likely that 
the Court would want to address this issue when it is the question for 
which certiorari is granted. 
It is often disappointing when the Supreme Court passes on an 
opportunity to establish a bright line rule on a given issue, but there 
 
 59. Id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 657. 
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are certain legal issues that simply can not be resolved in that way. 
Instead, it is sometimes necessary for the Court to allow rulings to 
occur on a case-by-base basis. This is the situation in Carey. Although 
the Court could have easily established a bright line rule as to 
whether spectators could wear buttons bearing an image of the victim 
in the courtroom, because of the competing interest on both sides—
fairness to the defendant and freedom of speech—the Court decided 
to defer to the lower courts, and allow them to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether a given practice in the trial courtroom is 
prejudicial. 
 
